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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant filed a motion seeking to set aside a
1971 judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the ground that the
court in the 1971 proceeding was without jurisdiction in the
matter before it.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's motion was argued before the Honorable
Calvin Gould, District Judge.

Judgment in the form of a

"Memorandum Decision" denying Defendant's motion was granted
in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
District Court entered in favor of Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Berrett were married in Pleasant View,
Utah on May 18, 1940.

Except for a brief sojourn of approxi-

mately one year in the State of Oregon, they resided in Utah
as man and wife until the summer of 1947 or 1948 when Mr.
Berrett moved to the State of New Mexico (R-60).
In 1948, after having established residency in
New Mexico, Mr. Berrett filed for divorce in that state
against Mrs. Berrett.

On January 19, 1949, the New Mexico

court granted Mr. Berrett a divorce decree.

The decree pro-

vided in part that Mr. Berrett pay Mrs. Berrett as and for
the support of the two minor children the sum of $100.00
per month (R-6).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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may contain errors.

The parties herein are in dispute as to the exact
time and under what circumstances that Mr. Berrett moved to
New Mexico, but the court below was of the opinion that
these factual disputes were immaterial (R-60).
In any event, two children had been born as issue
of the marriage, namely, Caroline Sally Berrett born in 1943
and David James Berrett born in 1948.

Both children were

born in Weber County, Utah, and Mrs. Berrett and the children
continued to reside in Utah after Mr. Berrett's departure
until her death in 1973.

Mr. Berrett resided in New Mexico

for a period of time after the divorce, then California,
and presently resides in Phoenix, Arizona.

From and after

his move from Utah to New Mexico, Mr. Berrett never again
resided in the State of Utah (R-60).
On October 29, 1971, Mrs. Berrett filed a petition
in the District Court of Weber County, Utah, requesting the
District Court to enforce the New Mexico divorce decree insofar
as it pertained to claimed child support in arrears.

Mr.

Berrett was personally served with a copy of said petition
in Maricopa County, Arizona, on November 16, 1971.

Juris-

diction over Mr. Berrett, according to the petition, was
claimed to be valid under the Utah longarm statute, §78-27-24,
§78-27-25, and §78-27-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Mr. Berrett failed to plead, appear or otherwise respond to
this petition and on December 28, 1971, a default judgment was
granted Mrs. Berrett against Mr. Berrett for child support in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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arrears in the sum of $19,625.00 (R-61).
In 1973, Mrs. Berrett died intestate leavinq aa ber
sole heirs at law her two children, Caroline and David.

~

sole asset in her estate is the 1971 judgment against Defendant.
Mrs. Berrett's heirs are seeking enforcement of the 1971
judgment by levying against a Utah inheritance left to Mr.
Berrett by his deceased parents (R-61) and as indicated, Mr.
Berrett is seeking to have the judgment voided (R-60).
Upon these facts, the court below found that in
the 1971 proceeding, it did have jurisdiction over the matter
before it and that its jurisdiction was exercised in a manner
sufficient to satisfy basic due process (R-60, 61, 62).
POINT I
THE STATUTE EXPRESSLY RESTRICTS JURISDICTION
TO ACTIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; NO
PROVISION IS MADE FOR CHILD SUPPORT ACTIONS
Utah's longarm statute, insofar as it might be
pertinent to the facts of this case, provides as follows:
78-27-24 Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Acts

submitting person to Jurisd1ct1on - Any person,
notwithstanding section 16-10-102, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this state, who
in person or through an agent does any of the
following enumerated acts, submits himself,
and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state as to any claim arising from:.
(6) With respect to actions of divorce.and .
separate maintenance, the maintenance ~n th1s
state of matrimonial domicile at the t1me the
claim arose or the commission in this state
of the act giving rise to the claim.
Appellant believes that this Court must first
address itself to the issue as to whether or not Utah's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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longarm statute restricts jurisdiction to actions between
husband and wife or whether it also allows for matters
incidental to separation or divorce such as claims for child
support.
There is an extensive Law Review article on Utah's
longarm statute in Utah Law Review, Volume 1970 commencing at
Page 222 entitled "In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded:
Longarm Statute."

Utah's

Beginning at Page 241 of the Note, the

writers discuss subsection {6) of Section 24.
The writers analyze that the primary benefit of
subsection {6) is to permit a wife residing in this state to
sue her deserting husband for divorce or separate maintenance
and obtain an enforceable order for support without being
required to make service in Utah.

The writers go on to note

that the "act" committed in Utah must be a type of act giving
rise to a claim for divorce or separate maintenance and does
not provide for jurisdiction in claims for annulment or in
claims for the custody or support of children.
Review 1970, Pages 242-245.

Utah Law

A strict application of the

statute would therefore preclude jurisdiction of the court
under subsection (6).
There are a number of jurisdictions where longarm
statutes expressly include not only acts giving rise to
divorce or separation, but also to claims involving actions
for annulment or to claims incidental to divorce such as
custody and support of children.

See 76 ALR3d 708 titled

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Long arm Statutes:

Obtaining Jurisdiction over llonreaiA!eln,

Parents in Filiation or Support Proceedings.•

AppellaDt

submits that had the legislature intended to include

c~

in addition to those expressly included in the statute, it
would have been a simple matter to do so and that UDder the
circumstances, this Court should strictly interpret tbe
language of the statute in its application to the facta of
this case.

The statute in question is limited to acta giving

rise to claims for divorce or separate maintenance and
jurisdiction is not extended to claims for nonsupport as in
the case before this Court.
POINT II
MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE IN UTAH TERMINATED
WITH THE ENTRY OF THE NEW MEXICO DIVORCE
DECREE AND PRIOR TO ANY CLAIM ARISING
As indicated in Point I, Utah's longarm statute,
insofar as it is pertinent to the facts of this case, provides
for jurisdiction over nonresidents "with respect to actions
of divorce and separate maintenance, the maintenance in this
state of matrimonial domicile at the time the claim arose or
the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the
claim"

see 78-27-24(6),

u.c.A.,

1953, as amended.

It is difficult to determine whether in 1971 the
Court below found jurisdiction because it found "maintenance
in this state of a matrimonial domicile at the time the claim
arose," or because it found that Mr. Berrett had committed in
this state some type of act or acts giving Mrs. Berrett a
This is because the
Sponsoredfor
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
Fundingboth
for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
claim
action,
or for
reasons.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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file, insofar as it refers to the 1971 proceedings, is
devoid of any transcript, findings of fact, or conclusions of
law in support of the decision of the Court at that time
(R-1 through R-8).
It appears clear, however, that the Court below
in the instant proceedings here appealed from found jurisdictioo
not because of acts committed in Utah by Mr. Berrett giving
rise to a claim by Mrs. Berrett, but rather because matrimonial
domicile continued in the State of Utah even though Mr. Berrett
had left the state sometime prior to the entry of the New
Mexico divorce decree (R-61, 62).
The Court below apparently found that the so-called
"minimal contacts" test for the statute had been met by the
existence at one time of a matrimonial domicile in the State
of Utah and that Mr. Berrett's duties and obligations,
including that of support for his children, were thereby
fixed and continued despite the fact that he thereafter
established residency elsewhere (R-61, 62).
The reasoning of the Court below may have some merit
had Mrs. Berrett's 1971 petition been based on some common law
duty of support arising out of Mr. Berrett's having fathered
these children with or without the benefit of wedlock.

How-

ever, Plaintiff's 1971 petition was not based upon the foregoing concept or theory, but was based on a specific order
for support arising out of the New Mexico divorce decree
(R-1, 2).

With the entry of that decree, matrimonial domicile

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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terminated for both Mr. and Mrs. Berrett and each party then
assumed domicile independently of the other, Mr. Berrett by
continuing to reside in the State of.New Mexico and Mrs.
Berrett by continuing to reside in the State of Utah.

It is

important to note that Mrs. Berrett's domicile in Utah from
and after the entry of the New Mexico decree of divorce was
in no way based upon matrimony, but on individual and
independent selection.

See 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 561.

Clearly and chronologically, Mrs. Berrett's claim as outlined
in her 1971 petition arose after the severance of matrimonial
domicile in the State of Utah and the statute, insofar as it
provides for "maintenance in this state of a matrimonial
domicile at the time the claim arose," was not present.
POINT III
APPELLANT DID NOT COMMIT ACTS IN THE STATE OF
UTAH GIVING RISE TO A CLAIM FOR NONSUPPORT
As noted previously, the longarrn statute provides
for jurisdiction with respect to claims not only where there
is matrimonial domicile at the time the claim arises, but also
in cases where an individual commits in this state an act or
acts giving rise to a claim for divorce or separate maintenance
(or claims incidental thereto if this Court should so hold).
Again reference is made to the annotation found in
76 ALR3d 708 in consideration of the issues presented under
this point.

A careful reading of the annotation and the cases

cited therein would indicate that the courts in each fact
situation were looking at one or more of three factors, namely:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1.

Were there certain "minimal contacts" between

the father and the forum state?
2.

What interests does the forum state have in

the controversy that is the subject of the litigation?
3.

May a nonact such as failure to pay child support

constitute a "tort" within the meaning of the statute?
Thus in cases involving paternity, certain jurisdictions found merely fathering a child in the forum state
constituted "minimal contacts."

Backora v. Balkin (1971)

14 Ariz App 569, 485 P2d 292; Neill v. Ridner (1972) 153 Ind
App 149, 286 NE2d 427.
It is to be noted that the above cases are distinguishable from the case at hand because the issue in them
obviously concerned an act (i.e., fathering a child) in the
forum state, whereas in our case, the claim in the 1971
petition failed to allege any acts by Appellant in Utah (R-1, 2).
Mrs. Berrett predicated her 1971 petition for
judgment for nonsupport expressly upon the New Mexico divorce
decree entered January 19, 1949.

The time of the decree is

critical because the file is devoid of any facts or circumstances
that could be construed as "acts" or "minimal contacts" by
Appellant within the State of Utah from and after the entry
of the decree.
namely,

All contacts of Appellant prior to that time,

(1) marriage in Utah,

(2)

living in Utah in matrimony,

and ( 3) fathering children in Utah, necessarily become immateri;:
because they precede the document and event upon which Mrs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-8-by the Utah State Library.
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-,.
--~

Berrett predicated her claim for relief.
Next the cases cited above, namely, Back9ca aa4

~'

and others have discussed the interests of the forua ·~-- in
the subject of the litigation.

See also Poindexter v. Wiliif

(1970) 23 Ohio Mise 199, 51 Ohio Ops 2d 157, 256 HB2d 254r
Van Wagenburg v. Van Wagenburg (1966) 241 Md 154, 215 A 2d 112,
27 ALR3d 379, cert den 385 US 833, 17 LEd 2d 68, 87 S Ct 73.
Emphasis is made in these cases upon the fact that the minor
children involved may become wards of the forum state and tbat
the state therefore has a direct financial interest in the
litigation.
It seems as though these cases in discussing the
presence of the minor children within the forum state ignore
the "in personam" issue before them and assume a type of
"in rem" jurisdiction because of the presence of the minor
children they are seeking to protect.

It must be pointed

out that conversely to the foregoing illustrations, the 1971
petition by Mrs. Berrett did not in the least involve facts
that would give the Court this type of "in rem" interest in
the litigation.

In 1971, the State of Utah had no past,

present, or future interest in the support of Mrs. Berrett's
children who by that time had attained their adulthood.
In addition, the reasoning of Poindexter has been
criticized and not followed in a number of other jurisdictions,
n arne 1y ,

G.L.P. (1973) 180 Colo 434, 507 P2d 468;

V.
::A:..:.·.:.:R:..:.·.:::B:..:.·__::._:_.:=..;...=...:...:....:..

State of Kansas ex rel Carrington v. Shutts (1975) 217 Kan
175, 535 P2d 982; Inkelas v. Inkelas (1968) 295 NYS 2d 350.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Finally, some of the cases found in the annotation
have determined that the failure to support a child constitutes
a "tort" ·Within the meaning of their longarrn statute.
Poindexter, supra; see also State ex rel Nelson v. Nelson
(1974) 298 Minn 438, 216 NW2d 140; Gentry v. Davis (1974)
Tenn 512 SW2d 4.
Respondent could argue that the alleged failure
to pay support under the divorce decree constitutes the
commission by Appellant of a "tort" under subsection (3)
of the statute which provides for longarrn jurisdiction over
a nonresident who causes tortious injury within the State
of Utah.

See §78-27-23(3), U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
Black defines "tortious" as "of the nature of a

tort."
injury.

"Tort" is defined as "a private or civil wrong or
A wrong independent of contract."

See Black's

Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968), Pages 16601661.

In Poindexter, Nelson and Gentry, the courts were

faced with an alleged existing duty of support between a
putative father and minor children then living in the forum
state.

They found an existing duty of support from father

to child that if breached, would cause resulting damage or
injury to the child.

In this sense, Appellant can follow

the reasoning of those cases where those facts then existed,
although again this reasoning is criticized and not followed
in

~·,

Carrington and Inkelas.
In 1971, Mr. Berrett owed no duty of support to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Berrett children (R-1, 2).

The Order to Show cau..

served on Mr. Berrett required that he appear and show
cause why the New Mexico decree "should not be enforced 1D
the State of Utah" and "why you should not be found an4 bel4
in contempt of Court . • • " (R-3).

Does the petition or tbe

directive of the Court sound in tort in the sense defiDed
Black?

~

Nor do the facts as they existed in 1971 cont.-plate

the commission of a tort by Appellant as contemplated by the
statute.
In summary, it becomes clear that Mr. Berrett
d~d

not commit any acts in the State of Utah nor were there

any significant contacts with the State of Utah at the
critical point in time, namely, from and after January 19,
1949.
CONCLUSION
At the time Mrs. Berrett's alleged cause of action
arose, matrimonial domicile in this state was nonexistent.
Nor did Mr. Berrett commit acts in this state satisfying
the "minimum contacts" requirements contemplated by the
longarm statute.

The judgment of the Court below should

be reversed.
Respectfully Submitted,

Attorney for Appellant
2650 washington Boulevard
Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401
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